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Abstract
If households face uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, theory predicts that re-
distributive tax and transfer systems have both an insurance and a distortionary effect.
Exploiting the substantial variation of tax and transfer systems across US states and
over time we investigate the necessary traces of these two effects in the data: that
state-level measures of redistributive taxation should correlate negatively with, (a) the
standard deviation, and (b) the mean, of the within-state consumption distribution.
We find that the first correlation is robust, supporting strongly the presence of an
insurance effect. The distortionary effect can also be detected in the data but it is less
precisely estimated.
JEL Classification: E21, H20, H31
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1 Introduction
Much analysis of household consumption focuses on the study of choices made by forward-
looking wealth-accumulating agents who face undiversifiable idiosyncratic labor income shocks
and liquidity constraints.1 Incorporating this partial-equilibrium consumer problem into
workable simulation/calibration models of the macro economy that explicitly allow for het-
erogenous agents has become standard ever since the pioneering work by Bewley (1986),
Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994). Critical policy issues arise from the inclusion of id-
iosyncratic risk. In these macro models of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk markets are in-
complete and agents face the probability of not being able to smooth consumption through
borrowing. Hence distortionary income taxes might improve aggregate welfare, because such
taxes directly compress the spread of uncorrelated idiosyncratic income shocks a-priori. In
other words, marginal income taxes may have an insurance effect by decreasing the effec-
tive fluctuations of after-tax individual income, a point also made in an earlier literature by
Mirrlees (1974) and Varian (1980). Consistent with these ideas, Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger
(2008), calibrate a heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk and find that optimal
marginal income tax rates are positive and sizeable.
In any idiosyncratic earnings risk model where consumer goods are normal, with or
without labor/savings distortions, the insurance effect of redistributive taxation would im-
ply that higher taxes and transfers decrease the standard deviation of consumption across
1For example, Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1995), and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) offer supporting evidence that some combination of precautionary saving and/or liquidity
constraints can be important determinants of saving and consumption dynamics.
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households.2 However, average consumption may be lower due to reduced incentives for cap-
ital accumulation and/or labor supply. The traditional approach without idiosyncratic risk
has emphasized the distortionary effect of taxes, i.e., the reduction in average consumption
that decreases welfare. The more recent literature, in which agents face uninsured idiosyn-
cratic risk, demonstrates the insurance effect of redistributive taxes, a reduction in each
household’s consumption variability that may raise welfare.3 The relative importance of
these two effects is crucial when evaluating the welfare effects of fiscal policy. Nevertheless,
assessing whether the distortionary and insurance effects of redistribution through the tax
and benefit system can indeed be observed in the data remains an open question. Testing
for the presence of these effects is therefore the aim of this study.
We examine the empirical evidence on the effect of taxes and transfers on the mean, and
the standard deviation of consumption across households, in order to investigate the traces of
the distortionary and the insurance effect in consumption. Demonstrating empirically these
effects, however, is not a trivial task: it requires using household data to construct measures
of the tax system, and of the distribution of consumption. One possibility is to investigate
households in different countries. However, we believe that cross-country variation in the key
variables may reflect differences in institutional, cultural and other country-specific features,
as well as differences in the measurement of the appropriate household level variables in dif-
2A transfer system is not necessary for higher marginal taxation to generate a more compressed distri-
bution. Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) show in a partial equilibrium model how realistic increases in labor
income marginal tax rates can cause large reductions in after-tax labor income risk.
3Floden (2001) provides a clear evaluation of the welfare effects showing the tradeoff between distortions
and insurance.
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ferent national surveys. Moreover, the design of these household surveys differs substantially
among countries, making it difficult to construct consistent measures of consumption and of
the tax system across countries.
Rather than using differences across countries, we exploit differences across US states
and over time to investigate the relationship within each state between consumption and
the tax system. The difficulties highlighted above are likely to be much less important for
US states since, in measuring taxes or consumption, the same survey can be exploited for
all households in the sample. Using the same survey across tax regimes reduces the chance
that differences in survey design spuriously generate the different measured policy responses.
However, there are two obvious disadvantages. First, relatively few households will be used
in each state in measuring the tax system or the distribution of consumption for that state,
hence such state-level measures are likely to be contaminated by measurement error. Second,
households find it easier to move between US states than between countries. Both problems
are likely to make it more difficult to demonstrate the effects of redistributive taxes on the
distribution of consumption. Nevertheless, using data on US states has a major advantage
in that it allows us to exploit the surprisingly large variation in tax regimes between states
and over time. This makes the US an appropriate “laboratory” in which to test the effect
of taxes on consumption.
Our empirical investigation necessitates constructing measures of consumption and of
taxes for different states. For consumption, we use 24 years from the American Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). The data allows us to compute the mean and the standard de-
viation of log non-durable consumption by year and state. To construct the tax measures,
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we first collect household income data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and then
use the TAXSIM model. This program, provided by the NBER, takes inputs about each
household’s income and other characteristics to construct the state and the federal tax lia-
bility, as well as the marginal tax rates, of each household in the data (full details on the
TAXSIM model can be found in Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). From the TAXSIM output we
construct two different measures of the tax system in each state. One is the mean marginal
tax rate across households in each state and each year. However, this measure of taxes has
serious drawbacks as a measure of redistributiveness: it ignores tax progressivity as well as
transfers. We therefore also construct a measure of tax redistribution that reflects the com-
pression of the income distribution induced by both taxes and transfers. We report results
for both measures of the tax system, although, as will be discussed further below, we prefer
the measure of redistributive taxation.
The empirical exercise investigates the relationship between redistributive taxation and
consumption. We find evidence that more redistributive taxes are negatively correlated with
the standard deviation of (log) non-durable consumption. The conclusions are robust to
unobserved heterogeneity at the state level and to expanding the specification to include
variables that vary both across states and over time, such as the state unemployment rate.
The results are unchanged when we address the possible endogeneity of our tax measure by
using appropriate instruments. We therefore find evidence supporting the presence of an
insurance effect of redistributive taxation in the US.
Our results also suggest that there is evidence for the distortionary effect of higher taxes,
although the negative correlation of redistributive taxes with state-level mean consumption
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is not as robust as the correlation concerning the insurance effect. Nevertheless, after con-
trolling for state effects, the results are always significant when using the mean marginal
tax rate, and are also significant when using the income compression measure of taxes if the
tax system is appropriately instrumented. Demonstrating the insurance effect means it is
important to stress the appropriate policy tradeoffs (between the distortionary and insurance
effects) in models of taxes which incorporate idiosyncratic risk.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and compare the
tax system in different US states. We present the empirical findings and provide robustness
checks in Section 3, while we make concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Data
Our empirical exercise exploits cross-state differences in the evolution of state taxation and
its relationship to the distribution of consumption. To proceed, we need to measure the
mean and standard deviation of household consumption within each state and each year,
and also to measure tax redistributiveness for those states. In turn, this requires measuring
each household’s consumption, income and taxes using household level data. To construct
a reasonably homogeneous sample of households across the different states, we select prime-
age households (where the head is between the ages of 30 and 60) and exclude self-employed
and farming households.
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2.1 Consumption
We use CEX data from 1982 to 2005 to measure household non-durable consumption. The
CEX is a household level survey, run on a yearly basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) for computing the weights for the American Consumer Price Index. The CEX has
detailed information on individual expenditure items, as well as on a variety of household
characteristics (including state of residence). This allows us to construct a measure of non-
durable consumption that includes food and beverages, tobacco, housekeeping services, fuel,
public utilities, repairs, public transport, personal care, entertainment, clothing, and books.
Households are interviewed four times, and report their expenditures in the 3 months before
the interview month. To minimize the recall error, we keep only the expenditure for the
month closest to the interview month. More details on the CEX survey can be found in
Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2005).4 We restrict the sample to those households for
which full state information is available.5 In order to keep the sampling error low we include
only the 22 largest states (those states with, on average, 80 observations per year).
Consumption is deflated by the (region-specific) Consumer Price Index in order to convert
nominal values into real ones. Finally, to control for cross-state differences in demographic
composition, we regress non-durable consumption on a cubic polynomial in age, education,
4However, see the Online Appendix for regression analysis that includes all three months to which the
interview refers, showing the results are broadly similar if that specification is used instead.
5By comparing the sample for which we have state information with the sample for which we do not have
state information, we find that the share of male household heads in the missing state information sample
is comparable to that in the non-missing information sample (71% versus 70%). Moreover, in both of these
subsamples the average age is 47.5, the family size 2.5 persons, and the number of kids 0.7.
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family-size, race, and marital status and construct group averages from the residuals.
2.2 Income and Transfers
To measure how much redistribution there is through the tax system, household level in-
formation on both income and transfers is required. This information is obtained from the
March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). This survey, also run by the
BLS, is designed to give very detailed and accurate information on income and demographics.
Using income (and transfer) data from the CPS has several advantages. First, the survey
asks much more detailed questions on income than does the CEX. Second, more house-
holds are surveyed, making state level averages more accurate. Third, in the regressions
we will have consumption measures on the left-hand side and income/tax measures on the
right-hand side: taking the income and consumption measures from different surveys ensures
measurement errors in these variables are uncorrelated.
Using the CPS we construct total household labor income and transfer income (which
includes social security and railroad retirement income, supplementary security income, un-
employment compensation, worker’s compensation and veterans payments, public assistance
or welfare, and the value of food stamps received).6 The data, summarized in Table 1,
shows that the average transfer over the whole sampled population of non-self-employed,
non-farming prime age households amounts to $883. Moreover, 22.2 percent of households
receive some sort of transfer. Conditional on receiving at least something, households receive
6While there is some evidence that unearned income is under-reported in the CPS, see Ruser, Pilot and
Nelson (2004), we believe this problem is unlikely to seriously distort the results in this study since it is
likely to affect residents in all states equally.
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an average of $3,771. This should be compared to the average household salary in the survey
of $30,350, or $14,916 for those households that are receiving transfers. While this amount
may seem small, for some households it can make a substantial difference to their after tax
(and transfer) income.
2.3 Household Taxes
US households pay taxes on earned and unearned income, as well as sales and property taxes.
We concentrate on income taxes, which are raised at both the state and the federal level,
and exclude sales and property taxes. Sales taxes are paid at the place of sale rather than
residence, making it difficult to measure the sales taxes levied on households within the state
if cross-border shopping takes place. In the CEX, the spending figure excludes sales taxes,
so that expenditure is comparable across states. Property taxes are largely levied at the
county/schoolboard/city level. Therefore, the property tax legislation may be very diverse
within each state depending on the locality where the households resides.
Constructing a single measure of tax redistributiveness in each state is not trivial and
entails addressing a number of problems.7 Income tax systems can be complicated since not
only do different households face different tax rates, but there is also considerable variation
in tax rates across jurisdictions.
The first column of Table 2 shows the lowest and the highest federal tax bracket for 2003,
a representative year near the end of our sample period. The federal marginal tax rate varies
7We deliberately use the term ‘redistributive’ rather than ‘progressive’ as ‘progressiveness’ is most often
used to describe a tax system in which the marginal tax rate increases with income (or wealth). For example,
a tax rate of 100%, with lump-sum transfers, is not progressive although it is highly redistributive.
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non-linearly from 10% for single people whose annual income is less than $7,000 ($14,000
for married couples filing jointly) up to 35% for incomes over $311,950 with additional tax
brackets of 15%, 25%, 28% and 33% for single filers whose annual income is under $28,400,
$68,800, and $143,500 (with higher bracket limits for household heads and couples filing
jointly). These tax rates and tax brackets have all changed over the years. Before 1987
a much larger number of tax brackets was applicable, while before 1996 around 15-20% of
people had incomes that were not sufficiently high for them to pay any federal income tax.
In an early paper, Feenberg and Rosen (1987) document the large variation of tax regimes
across states for 1977-1983. They show that in 1983, in all but four states there was no
federal deduction for state income taxes paid, while in fifteen states the deduction for federal
income taxes paid was allowed (in seven states within a limit). In fifteen states couples and
individuals had different schedules and in seventeen income splitting was allowed.
The remaining rows of Table 2 describe the variation in state tax rates in 2003 and
demonstrate the large differences in state marginal tax rates and exemptions in different
states. It shows that several states, including Texas, Florida, and Washington, do not levy
any income taxes on their residents. The other states have a variety of income tax bands and
exemptions (or tax credits) that are applicable. Although some states, such as Massachusetts
and Illinois, have a flat rate income tax, in most states, the marginal tax rate increases with
income. The difference between the highest and lowest marginal tax rate can sometimes be
large. In Ohio the lowest marginal tax rate is 0.743% and the highest is 7.5%, while several
states have marginal tax rates even higher for the highest earning households. There are
also, typically, a variety of tax allowances to which households are entitled. While there is
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no tax exempt income in Pennsylvania, up to $8,800 of income is exempt from state income
tax in Massachusetts for married couples, but only $1,000 for each dependent –in contrast to
Minnesota which allows the same exempt level of income for the earner, the earner’s partner,
and each other dependent.
To construct each household’s income tax burden, we exploit the TAXSIM 8.0 program
developed by Feenberg (see Feenberg and Coutts, 1993, for details), and provided by the
NBER. Using a variety of household variables taken from the CPS, including the husband’s
and wife’s earnings, interest, dividends and other income, and information about the house-
hold’s characteristics (such as the number of dependant children) and other deductibles (like
property costs) as well as the year and state of residence, the program calculates the house-
hold’s state and the federal tax liability, and the marginal tax rates, explicitly controlling
for a variety of allowances. The output of the TAXSIM program allows us to measure how
redistributive the tax system is in each state.
2.4 Measuring Tax Redistributiveness
No completely satisfactory measure of redistributiveness exists, but given the output pro-
vided by the TAXSIM program, several measures are possible. Rather than explicitly model
all the different effective marginal tax rates (and transfers) that are available, we instead
reduce the problem to constructing an index that summarizes the tax system in each state.
One obvious measure is to compute the average marginal tax rate across households within
each time period t and state j. This is calculated as the mean of the household marginal
(federal and state) tax rates obtained from the TAXSIM program. The second to last column
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of Table 2 reports the average over the entire sample period of this tax measure for each
of the states included in our sample. The mean marginal tax rate for the whole of the US
(taking federal and state taxes together) is 23.3 percent, but the differences across states are
surprisingly large. The mean marginal tax rate in Texas and Florida, where there is no state
income tax, is just over 18 percent, but is around 27 percent in Maryland and in Wisconsin.
That is, taxes in the latter two states are 50 percent higher than in Florida.
The mean marginal tax rate, however, accounts neither for transfers nor for heterogeneity
amongst household tax rates. As we saw earlier, marginal taxes differ substantially across
agents even within the same year and state. Furthermore, agents have many exemptions,
allowances, and transfers available to them that depend upon their household characteristics.
Hence the mean marginal tax rate does not adequately capture the progressivity of the tax
system. For example, a mean marginal tax rate of 20 per cent in a state could be due to all
households paying a marginal tax rate of 20 per cent; or to the bottom fifth of the population
paying 100 percent and the rest nothing; or to the top 20 per cent paying 100 percent and the
rest nothing. These three cases have substantially different implications for redistribution.
To address these concerns about using the mean marginal tax rate, we also construct
a more direct measure of how much the tax system compresses or redistributes income
which explicitly accounts for transfers, and for the fact that the marginal tax rate differs
across households. This measure is similar to measures of government redistribution used by
Attanasio and Rı´os-Rull (2000) and Krueger and Perri (2006). This “income compression”
measure is defined as,
1− sdjt (incomeijt − tax liabilityijt + transfersijt)
sdjt(incomeijt)
(1)
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where the tax liability is obtained from the TAXSIM program, and i denotes the household.
This measure is computed for households that reside in a given state j in a given time period
t as one minus the ratio of the standard deviation of income after tax and transfers to the
standard deviation of income before tax and transfers.8 Given that the mean marginal tax
rate conceals large differences in the households’ marginal tax rates, the income compression
measure will be our preferred measure of redistribution through the tax system. Moreover, it
includes transfers which are ignored when measuring the tax system using the mean marginal
tax rate.
The last column of Table 2 reports the income compression measure of taxes for each of
the states in our sample. The income compression measure of taxes varies substantially across
the US, as does the mean marginal tax rate. However, the income compression measure is
consistently higher since it accounts for transfers and for tax progressivity. Nevertheless,
the rank ordering of states is similar (the correlation between the two measures is 0.74).
The lowest value in the continental US for the income compression measure of taxes and
transfers is in Washington at 24.9%, while the highest value, at 34.8%, is in New York
(traditionally viewed as one of the states with the most progressive taxation). That is, the
tax and transfer system is 50 percent more redistributive in New York than in, for example,
8Using variances instead of standard deviations in equation (1) can allow the decomposition of the variance
of after tax income into the variance of gross income, the variance of taxes and the covariance between the
two. However, we prefer the standard deviation measure in order to satisfy certain desirable requirements.
For example, if everyone faces the same flat marginal tax rate with no allowances it is plausible to require
that the resulting measure is equal to this common marginal rate. Using the variance would violate this
requirement.
12
Florida. Taking both tax measures, the numbers in Table 2 show that there is enough
variation across states to get meaningful results, a key issue if we are to convincingly assess
the theoretical predictions, and results are reported for both measures.
3 The Empirical Evidence
The substantial variation of tax regimes across US states and over time allows us to show how
the two measures of taxes are related to the mean and standard deviation of real non-durable
log-consumption (referred throughout as the mean and standard deviation of consumption).
To control for observed heterogeneity at the household level, the following procedure was
adopted: in the first stage household consumption was regressed against a cubic polynomial
in age, education, family-size, month, year, race, and marital status. Group averages were
then constructed from the residuals.9
Included in the regression are the 22 states for which we had the most household obser-
vations. In choosing the cell size (the number of different household observations in each
state-year cell) we face a trade-off. Choosing a higher number of households in each cell im-
plies fewer observations in the regression which leads to higher standard errors. In contrast,
a smaller cell size generates a larger number of observations in the regression but increases
the within cell sampling error. Either problem makes it more difficult to find a significant
result in the regressions. We choose a minimum average cell size of 80 household observations
for each state each period. This choice means that 22 states are included in the regressions
and seems a reasonable compromise, given that for many states there are few observations.
9Omitting these first stage controls does not substantially change the results.
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Figure 1 presents a plot of the raw data of our measure of redistributive taxes and con-
sumption. The upper panel plots the income compression measure of taxes rate against the
standard deviation of consumption, the lower against the mean of consumption, with the
results reported in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4. The figures look similar when using the
mean marginal tax measure (those results are reported in column (5) of Tables 3 and 4). In
both cases we have also fitted a regression line through the observations but while down-
ward sloping, neither slope is significant. The effect on the standard deviation is, however,
significant if taxes are measured using the mean marginal tax rate, or (as is discussed in the
Online Appendix) the consumption data is trimmed.
The simple regressions shown in Figure 1 neglect a number of issues. First, there could
be systematic differences across states that obscure or amplify the effects of taxes on con-
sumption. Such differences might depend on differences in the population composition across
states and might not be orthogonal to the marginal tax rates. Second, business cycle effects
jointly affect income and consumption, and therefore have the potential to lie behind the as-
sociation between taxes and the moments of consumption. Third, state specific time-varying
income risks might affect either the level or the dispersion of consumption. To the extent that
tax variables proxy for these risks, one may find a negative association between consumption
dispersion and taxes, which may be unrelated to the insurance effect of taxation. Fourth,
taxes and consumption might be jointly determined and therefore our estimates could be
affected by a standard endogeneity problem. Therefore, we devote the rest of the paper to
understanding how robust is the relation between taxes and consumption.10
10We also undertake further robustness checks in the Online Appendix which investigates the effect of
trimming the data of low consumption households (since taking logs could make the data sensitive to low
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3.1 The Insurance Effect of the Tax System
Table 3 shows the regressions using the standard deviation of log consumption as the de-
pendent variable. The first five columns report the results when the tax system is measured
using our preferred income compression measure, while the last five columns use the mean
marginal tax rate. A negative relationship between the tax system and the standard devia-
tion of log consumption when using raw data may partly reflect the fact that there are many
factors that affect the level of wealth or taxes in an economy that are unrelated to taxes.
To control for this, we include state dummies in all regressions. This removes any fixed
differences across states. Columns (2) and (7) report the results for the simplest specifi-
cation that account for state effects. The coefficients are negative, and are also statistically
significant at the 5 and 1 percent level.
A further concern with these regressions is that taxes and transfers, and income or con-
sumption shocks, may be co-determined. For example, a positive productivity or income
shock to the state is likely to affect the state’s budget (and hence tax requirements) as well
as affect households’ levels of gross income and consumption in the state. Alternatively, the
observed differences across states might come from unobservable heterogeneity in preferences
or household attributes at the household level. Other differences may arise from cross-state
variation in the underlying idiosyncratic component of the income process at the house-
hold level (for example, if social-security contributions and benefits are related to household
features or employment histories).
outliers) and using all three months to which each interview in the CEX refers, rather than just the month
closest to the interview month. We thank two anonymous referees for recommending these checks.
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Sampling households whose heads are aged between 30 and 60 helps to control for many
of the potential problems due to heterogeneity in personal attributes at the household level,
as does the inclusion of state dummies. However, potential endogeneity problems could still
occur. To address these potential problems, we rely on two different sets of instrumental
variables that predict the extent of redistribution through taxes and transfers but do not
affect current consumption insurance directly. Our first set of instruments includes lagged
values of the redistribution measures. However, it would also be useful to look at a measure
of the expected tax system where the expectation depends on the effectiveness of the state
administration in raising tax revenue, and the likely taste for redistribution of the local
residents in the state. We accomplish this by instrumenting the tax system with a set of
lagged political variables, and two additional variables: a measure of the tax raising ability,
or tax fiscal capacity of the state in each period; and a measure of the tax intensity or effort
in each period. We will call the whole instrument set “political variables”.
For the years up to 1991, data on tax efficiency are available from ACIR (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1993), while data for subsequent year are taken
from Tannenwald (2002) and Tannenwald and Turner (2004), although it was necessary to
linearly interpolate the series for some years. More details on these measures are available in
Tannenwald (2002). To these two measures we add a set of instruments containing political
variables (like the political affiliation of the state governor and the state legislature, and
the proportion of voters in a state voting democratic rather than republican in presidential
elections).11 Political variables are candidate instruments since they are likely to reflect
11The data were made available by Tim Storey at the National Conference of State Legislatures.
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attitudes towards redistribution, rather than general economic conditions.
Columns (3) and (8) of Table 3 investigate the effect of using the political variables, while
columns (4) and (9) instead use the lagged taxes as instruments. For both tax measures,
and for both instrument sets, the rank test is significant. Moreover, the Sargan test does
not reject the over-identifying restrictions for the income compression measure (column (3))
or for the mean marginal tax rate measure (column (8)). Combining the rank and Sargan
tests suggests that the political variables are suitable instruments for a regression of the tax
measure on mean consumption. The results show that the effect is not only negative for
both measures of the tax system, but also significant at the 1 percent level for the income
compression measure of taxes, and at the 5 percent level for the mean marginal tax rate
for both instrument sets. Using lagged taxes (columns (4) and (9)), the coefficients are
significant at the 1 percent level for both tax measures.
As a further test of the theory we include the state-specific business cycle effects with
the state unemployment rate in our regression in columns (5) and (10), instrumented by
its lag. Business cycle effects might be state-specific and come in the form of time-varying
income risk, which in turn affects the consumption distribution. By the same token, such
effects might also be correlated with our tax measures. Therefore, omitting to control for
those effects has the potential to lie behind our results. The coefficients remain significant
at the 5 percent level in column (5), and at the 1 percent level in column (10). Moreover,
these regressions suggest that as much as a quarter of the difference in inequality between
states can be explained by differences in how redistributive the tax system is (that is, the
estimated coefficient in the second column would account for a quarter of the difference in
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equality between the most and the least redistributitive state).
Overall the results suggest that making the tax system more redistributive substantially
reduces the standard deviation of consumption, or cross-sectional variability, as we would
expect. The evidence presented here points towards a negative relation between taxes and
consumption inequality. This finding supports the premise that tax systems provide insur-
ance to households.
3.2 The Distortionary Effect of the Tax System
If the tax system has a distortionary effect, then one would expect to observe a negative
correlation between taxes and mean consumption. As already stated, the basic regression
with no controls, corresponding to Figure 1 and reported in the first column of Table 4,
does not uncover a statistically significant relationship between mean consumption and the
mean marginal tax rate. However, as was argued for the standard deviation of consumption
results, it is important to account for various types of endogeneity that might affect this
conclusion. This analysis is reported in the remaining columns of Table 4.
To account for the cross-state differences in the composition of population within each
state and for the effect of unobservable variables that might be correlated with taxes, we
include state dummies in all regressions of Table 4. The results for the simple specification
containing state dummies show that the mean marginal tax rate is now negatively related
to mean consumption (column (7)) but the redistributiveness measure is not (column (2)),
suggesting, nevertheless, that a statistically significant negative correlation may be in the
data.
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We address the endogeneity of the tax variables by instrumenting, as we did for the
standard deviation of consumption regressions. For both tax measures, the effect of taxes on
mean consumption is large and statistically significant when we instrument with the political
variables (columns (3) and (8)), and the Sargan test is passed. Similarly significant results
are obtained when instrumenting with lagged taxes (columns (4) and (9)). When including
the state unemployment rate in the regression, only the negative correlation between the
mean marginal tax rate and mean consumption is preserved (column (10)). The correla-
tion between the redistributiveness measure and mean consumption becomes statistically
insignificant in this specification (column (5)).
Overall, the results using the mean marginal tax rate in Table 4 support the hypothesis
that a more redistributive tax system is associated with lower average consumption. However,
the results using the income compression measure are less convincing (in two cases they are
not significant at the 10 percent level). The evidence thus suggests that the correlation
between mean consumption and taxes is negative, though the extent of such correlation and
its precision depend on the particular measure of taxes used.
Our results thus confirm how difficult is to document the distortionary effect of taxes
and are consistent with the literature that has tried to estimate the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to the marginal tax rate. This line of research, initiated by studies
such as Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995), has shown how difficult it is to find empirically
a distortionary effect from higher taxation. This inconclusiveness is also similar to more
recent findings such as Backus, Henriksen, and Storesletten (2008), who focus on the effect
of taxes on global capital allocation and find mixed evidence on the relation between taxes
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and capital. It seems that investigating the empirical robustness of the theoretically plausible
distortionary effect of taxes on consumption is an open question for further future research.
4 Conclusions
When consumers face uninsurable, idiosyncratic income risk redistributive taxes have two
countervailing effects: an insurance and a distortionary effect. The first effect is captured
by a negative relationship between taxes and consumption dispersion across households.
The second effect is shown by a negative relationship between taxes and mean consumption.
Hitherto, however, there has been little empirical research into whether we can observe either
of these effects in the data, which is perhaps surprising given the prominence and vehemence
with which they have been discussed. This may partly be explained by the difficulty in
devising an appropriate test. We address this issue by investigating the differences in the
mean and standard deviation of log non-durable consumption when the redistributiveness
of the tax system varies using household level data. We take data for income and for
consumption from different data sources to eliminate spurious correlation in the state level
tax and consumption measures. Lastly, constructing a measure of the redistributiveness of
the tax system requires that we account for the fact that households receive transfers and
pay different effective tax rates. We construct an income compression measure to address
these concerns.
The US states provide a suitable “laboratory” since, perhaps surprisingly, these states
vary substantially in the degree to which their tax and benefit systems are redistributive.
We find strong supportive evidence for the presence of the insurance effect, as there is a neg-
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ative correlation between redistributive taxes and the standard deviation of log non-durable
consumption. We show that our results are not affected by unobserved heterogeneity at the
state level, or for the most part to nationwide and state-specific business cycle effects. More-
over, accounting for the potential endogeneity of taxes, by using appropriate instrumental
variables, does not alter our conclusions. The negative correlation between redistributive
taxes and within-state mean consumption is less resistant to the same robustness checks.
However, our results lend support to the empirical relevance of the distortionary effect of
redistributive taxation.
In summary, we find strong evidence for the insurance effect of redistributiveness through
the taxation system and milder evidence for the distortionary effect of taxation. Taken
together, we interpret our findings to suggest that these channels are an empirically relevant
consideration for policy analysis. Models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, such as, for
instance, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Floden (2001), Domeij and Heathcote (2002),
and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2008), thus stress an important issue in the evaluation of
policies financed through marginal income taxes.
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Table 1. Wages and transfers for US households 1982-2005
average average if received % receive
wages 30,350 32,922 92.2
social security 289 5,303 5.9
supplementary security income 81 3,210 3.0
public assistance / welfare 107 2,916 4.2
unemployment/workers compensation 275 2,491 11.5
food stamps 71 1,128 6.8
total transfer 833 3,771 22.2
Data is constructed from reported responses in the March supplement of the CPS for the years
1982-2005. Total transfer refers to the sum of social security benefits, supplementary security
benefits, unemployment or workers compensation, welfare or other public assistance, and food
stamps. The CPS questionnaire conflates social security benefits with railroad retirement
income, and worker’s compensation with veterans payments. All values are in 1984 real
dollars.
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Table 2. Federal and Selected State Income tax rates
State 2003 Tax Rates Exemptions mean tax
min. max. single married dependents tax rate redist.
Federal 10 35
Alaska no state income tax 18.9 22.8
Arizona 2.87 5.04 2,100 4,200 2,300 22.3 30.0
California 1.0 9.3 80* 160* 251* 23.6 33.9
Colorado 4.63 4.63 none 25.1 30.7
Florida no state income tax 18.3 25.9
Georgia 1.0 6.0 2,700 5,400 2,700 23.8 31.5
Illinois 3.0 3.0 2,000 4,000 2,000 22.7 29.6
Indiana 3.4 3.4 1,000 2,000 1,000 22.1 28.2
Maryland 2.0 4.75 2,400 4,800 2,400 26.9 32.8
Massachusetts 5.0 5.0 4,400 8,800 1,000 24.9 33.3
Michigan 4.0 4.0 3,000 6,000 3,000 23.8 31.4
Minnesota 5.35 7.85 3,000 6,000 3,000 27.4 34.4
Missouri 1.5 6.0 2,100 4,200 2,100 22.9 30.0
New Jersey 1.4 6.37 1,000 2,000 1,500 24.3 32.1
New York 4.0 6.85 - - 1,000 22.9 34.8
Ohio 0.743 7.5 1,200 2,400 1,200 22.9 30.7
Oregon 5.0 9.0 145* 290* 145* 25.9 32.8
Pennsylvania 2.8 2.8 none 21.2 29.0
Texas no state income tax 18.2 26.6
Virginia 2.0 5.75 800 1,600 800 25.8 31.3
Washington no state income tax 20.0 24.9
Wisconsin 4.6 6.75 700 1,400 400 27.0 33.0
Note. *Refers to Tax Credits rather exempt income. The federal and state taxes are for 2003. The data on
federal taxes are available from the Internal Revenue Service, US Department of Treasury. The data on state
taxes are available from the Federation of Tax Administrators at 444 N. Capital Street, Washington DC. The
‘min.’ and ‘max.’ refer to the minimum and maximum tax bracket in the state, ‘single’ and ‘married’ refer
to single filers and households in which the husband and wife jointly file, while ‘dependents’ refer to each
additional dependent person for which the file may claim. The last two columns report the mean marginal
tax rate and the tax-redistribution measure for each state for the entire sample period, constructed using
income from the March supplement of the CPS for 1982-2005, and using taxes reported from the NBER
TAXSIM programme. ‘Mean tax rate’ refers to the mean marginal tax rate across households while ‘income
compression’ refers to 1 minus to the ratio of the standard deviation of income after taxes (and transfers)
to the standard deviation of income before taxes.
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Figure 1. Non-Durable Consumption and Redistributive Taxation
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